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ABSTRACT 
 
In the paper, we tackle the following questions: Could the difficulty in solving the Schrödinger equation 
for an arbitrarily large system be a reflection of some nature’s intrinsic property? And if so, could this 
difficulty be a resolution to the measurement problem? 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
 
Dans le papier, nous abordons les questions suivantes : La difficulté en résolvant l'équation de Schrö-
dinger pour un système arbitrairement grand a-t-elle pu être une réflexion de la propriété intrinsèque 
d'une certaine nature? Et si oui, cette difficulté a-t-elle pu être une résolution au problème de mesure? 
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"The general theory of quantum mechanics is now complete… The under-
lying physical laws necessary for the mathematical theory of a large part of 
physics and the whole of chemistry are thus completely known and the difficulty 
is only that the exact application of these laws leads to equations much too com-
plicated to be soluble. It therefore becomes desirable that approximate practical 
methods of applying quantum mechanics should be developed, which can lead 
to an explanation of the main features of complex atomic systems without too 
much computation." – Paul Dirac, Quantum Mechanics of Many‐Electron Systems1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In accordance with inter-theoretic reductionism, in principle, any physical system can 
be described by the many-body Schrödinger equation as long as the constituent microscopic 
particles are not moving "too" fast; that is, if they are not moving near the speed of light. This 
covers a wide range of problems, so if we could manage to solve the Schrödinger equation, not 
only we would be able to predict the behavior of molecular, atomic, and subatomic systems, 
but also macroscopic ones, and possibly even the whole universe. 
Still, despite the fact that more than two generations of researchers were left to work 
out how to achieve this ambitious goal, the only exact solutions to the Schrödinger equation 
found so far are for free-particle motion, the particle in a box, the hydrogen atom, hydrogen-
like ions, the hydrogen molecular ion, the rigid rotator, the harmonic oscillator, Morse and 
modified Morse oscillators, and a few other systems2,3. For more complicated systems, howev-
er, approximation techniques have to be used (such as the variational method or perturbation 
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theory), which sometimes give poor results compared with experimental ones, and practical 
calculations with them are usually very difficult, even with the use of powerful computers4. 
The difficulty is that in a system made of N interacting particles (where N can be anywhere 
from three to infinity), the repeated interactions between particles create quantum correla-
tions. As a consequence, the dimension of the Hilbert space describing the system scales expo-
nentially in N. This makes a direct numerical calculation of the Schrödinger’s equation intrac-
table: Every time an extra particle is added to the system, the computational resources would 
have to be doubled5. 
On the other hand, computational power is increasing constantly. As we solve larger 
and more complex problems with greater computational power and cleverer algorithms day 
after day, we may assume that eventually we will be able to solve the many-body Schrödinger 
equation for a system of arbitrary complexity (at least, no law or known impossibility result in 
computational complexity theory can exclude such an assumption of infinite computational 
power). 
So, those, who criticize reductionism for being unable to solve problems in chemistry, 
biology, economics or psychology, might really have a problem only with its manifestation as a 
current working principle and not with reductionism itself, which is in theory capable to ac-
count for any higher-order phenomenon. The present-day reductionism has failed to reduce 
every explanation in every field of science to quantum mechanics probably because of tempo-
rary difficulties with solving the Schrödinger equation. Therefore, a hierarchical or layered 
view of the whole of nature, with the layers arranged in terms of increasing complexity with 
each requiring its own special science6, might turn out to be just a usable concept pending fu-
ture efficient solutions to the many-body Schrödinger equation. 
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Critiques of intertheoretic reductionism from the perspective of emergentism or holism 
emphasize a high amount of complexity in a system as the main argument setting a limit to re-
ductionism7. Systems in chemistry, biology, psychology, or sociology, they argue, are common-
ly so complex that it will not ever be possible to describe all their details8. Those systems are 
so complex that their behavior is, or appears, "new" or "emergent": It cannot be predicted 
from the properties of the elements alone9. Then again, complexity as an argument against re-
ductionism might be valid only in the interim, i.e., at the current level of computation10. If the 
number of calculations required to reach a solution for any given mathematical problem could 
be written as some polynomial function of the problem’s input size, then with a substantial 
computational power one would be able to describe any complex system in full detail and 
completely predict its behavior from the Schrödinger equation alone. 
It may seem that intertheoretic reductionism in company with infinite computational 
power would know no limit. And yet the infamous measurement problem in quantum mechan-
ics might prove a serious hindrance even for it. 
 
2. Measurement problem 
and the assumption of infinite computational power 
 
Briefly, the quantum measurement (or macro-objectification) problem runs as follows. 
The wavefunction in quantum mechanics evolves according to the Schrödinger equation into a 
sum (superposition) of different states, but the application of this principle to macroscopic 
systems appears to lead immediately to a disagreement with our everyday experience11. 
The assumption of infinite computational power merely makes this problem unambig-
uous. Indeed, if we assume that with a computer we may solve any given mathematical prob-
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lem in a reasonable amount of time, we won’t be able to claim any longer that both the Schrö-
dinger equation and its solution for an arbitrary macroscopic system can be presented only 
symbolically, i.e., in purely abstract terms, lacking any considerable content, even in the face of 
the internal complexity of the macroscopic system and its external environment. In that case, 
to paraphrase Schrödinger12, nothing would stop ‘‘indeterminacy originally restricted to the 
atomic domain” becoming transformed into “a macroscopic indeterminacy”: The linearity of 
the Schrödinger equation combined with infinite computational power would inevitably bring 
forth an actual and hence testable solution allowing the macroscopic system to be in a super-
position of macroscopically distinguishable states. 
Therefore, by assuming that we can compute the Schrödinger equation for any system 
in a reasonable time, we make the quantum description of a truly macroscopic object feasible 
and consequently obtain a situation where the theoretical inference clashes with the evidence: 
The calculated macroscopic quantum superpositions are at odds with the observed behavior 
of the macro-object. 
What are the ways out of this dilemma? In general, we may think of two principal 
routes leading from it. 
The first route is to insist on unrestricted, limitless reductionism and hence remaining 
within the framework of the orthodox or modified quantum mechanics find out why macro-
scopic quantum superpositions are not observable. 
The second route is to admit the limitation of reductionism and thus standing beyond 
the formalism of quantum mechanics find out why the quantum description is not applicable 
to macroscopic objects. 
The first route, meticulously studied and discussed in many books and countless pa-
pers, contains suggestions of changing the interpretation of quantum mechanics whilst leaving 
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the Schrödinger equation unchanged (which includes ideas from the many-worlds interpreta-
tion and the decoherence program to the one that physical reality is the product of discrete 
subphysical information processing equivalent to the actions of a probabilistic Turing 
machine13), in common with alternative suggestions of injecting new physics by modifying the 
Schrödinger equation (with, for example, an additional small, nonlinear contribution14). 
As to the second route, it is virtually unexploited other than some thoughts expressed 
by a few researchers now and then, which argued in favor of such an approach but did not 
elaborate it at length. 
Thus, for instance, Bohr15 has argued that classical physics does not emerge from quan-
tum physics as an approximation of the latter when   tends to zero.b His position is that classi-
cal concepts are autonomous from quantum theory and cannot be derived from it. As stated by 
Bohr's correspondence principle (in its strong form), it is inappropriate to treat macroscopic 
measuring instruments in purely quantum mechanical notions. 
In a similar vein, Ruža18 argued that “despite our theoretical views and assumptions, it 
seems that the perceived outside world is really split into two domains — the quantum one 
and the classical one. Every domain has its own rights to exist, neither has an ontological pri-
ority over another, i.e., there are no substantial, unconditional arguments for the primacy of 
quantum physics over classical”. 
But what is the reason for such a split between domains that poses a limit to reduction-
ism? 
                                                             
b The problem of the emergence of classical mechanics from quantum mechanics is still open. In spite 
of many results on the     asymptotics, it is not yet clear how to explain within standard quantum 
mechanics the classical motion of macroscopic bodies16. The limit     transforms quantum mechan-
ics into a classical probabilistic theory17. 
7 
 
As an explanation or justification for this split, we may adopt an idea just opposite to 
what we took on earlier: We may assume that computational power is actually limited, viz., 
that there exists a limit of what could be solved efficiently with a computer no matter how fast 
and powerful it might be. 
 
3. Assumption of limited computational power 
 
Namely, we will assume that solving the many-body Schrödinger equation in its most 
general form is such a mathematical problem that has no tractable computational solution. By 
“tractable computational solution”, we mean a solution that even in the worst case could be 
reached in the number of calculations  ( ) not greater than a polynomial expression of the 
problem’s input size   (which corresponds to the system’s number of degrees of freedom), i.e., 
 ( )   (  ) for some constant    . Let us briefly examine possible consequences of this 
assumption. 
1. According to the assumption, no fast solution to the Schrödinger equation for an ar-
bitrary system of N interacting microscopic particles would be ever known; hence, a solution 
to the many-body Schrödinger equation would always require, at most, a superpolynomial 
number of calculations  ( )     for all  . That is, the time required to solve the many-body 
Schrödinger equation would increase very quickly as the number of constituent particles N 
would grow. As a result, the time needed to reach a solution for a macroscopic system (i.e., the 
system which contains a number of constituent particles proportional to the Avogadro con-
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stant      ) could easily spread into the billions or trillions of years, using any amount of 
computing power available.c 
This would make the quantum mechanical formalism inapplicable to a truly macro-
scopic object: In any reasonable amount of time, this formalism would not be able to give to 
such an object a deterministic description that could be supported or falsified by the data of 
actual experience. 
2. Therewithal, the given assumption does not exclude the possibility that for some 
particular systems comprised of quite large numbers of particles there may be solutions to the 
Schrödinger equation reachable in realistic time. In addition, this assumption only relates to 
worst-case numbers of calculations; therefore, for certain systems the average number of cal-
culations taken to reach the solution on a mesoscopic or even a macroscopic scale may possi-
bly be reasonable. 
This may explain why neither mass, nor length, nor any other physical property of a 
physical object can serve as a stringent criterion for the boundary between quantum and clas-
sical descriptions. 
3. Further, the given assumption only considers numbers of calculations necessary to 
reach deterministic solutions to the Schrödinger equation. This suggests that a solution, which 
allows two-sided random errors in the solution’s parameters, might be reachable in a reason-
able number of calculations (even though the deterministic solution is not). In other words, it 
                                                             
c One may reply that quantum computers could simulate quantum physical processes exponentially 
faster than classical computers and accordingly they might solve the quantum many-body problem ef-
ficiently. However, no proof exists yet for the general superiority of quantum computers over their 
classical counterparts19. Specifically, quantum computers are neither known nor believed to be able to 
solve NP-complete problems efficiently20. 
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might be possible to reach a solution to the Schrödinger equation for a given system quickly – 
and therefore to make the quantum-mechanical description of this system feasible – at the 
cost of statistical uncertainty.d 
This implies that large systems (such as observers and their measuring apparatuses) 
might be described in quantitative terms only by non-deterministic solutions to the Schrö-
dinger equation. It may resolve the conflict between the deterministic dynamics of quantum 
mechanics and the postulate that during measurement a non-deterministic collapse of the 
wave packet occurred (the postulate of collapse). 
 
4. Postulate of collapse 
and the assumption of limited computational power 
 
Within the frame of the assumption of limited computational power (i.e., the intracta-
bility of the many-body Schrödinger equation), in most cases that involve solely microscopic 
systems, the deterministic solution to the Schrödinger equation might be reachable in realistic 
time (due to the small size of the problem). Consequently, quantum description of these sys-
tems could be valid: They would be completely described by the corresponding wave function 
that evolves gently, in a perfectly predictable and continuous way (that is, knowing the wave 
function at one moment, the Schrödinger equation determines – through a reasonable number 
of calculations – the wave function at any later time). However, as soon as a measurement is 
                                                             
d Speaking in general terms, letting uncertainty in the system’s solution can in effect make some de-
grees of freedom of the system irrelevant to the solution and hence possible to be skipped, which in 
turn can significantly lessen the amount of calculations needed to find the answer to such a simplified 
problem. 
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performed, a macroscopic system is involved, for which the Schrödinger equation has no trac-
table deterministic solution. Therefore, for a measuring array (composed of a measured mi-
croscopic system interacting with a macroscopic measuring device) a purely quantum descrip-
tion consisting of the Hilbert space tensor product of the state spaces associated with the mi-
croscopic system, the measuring device, and the totality of existence would be unfeasible (and 
accordingly inexpressible in quantitative terms). Instead, a quantum-mechanical description 
of the measuring process might be only statistical, i.e., one that is inexact (coarse‐grained), 
providing with errors. In the aggregate, these errors might prevent different elements in the 
quantum superposition of the measured microscopic system's wavefunction from interfering 
with each other, giving the appearance of wavefunction collapse. 
The next simple example illustrates this statement (the example follows the explana-
tion of the quantum decoherence given in the paper by Dass21 but assumes the intractability of 
the many-body Schrödinger equation). Consider a spin-  ⁄  particle (the test-particle) prepared 
in the state 
     |   ⟩  
 
√ 
(| ⟩  | ⟩)     (1) 
as it passes through a reversible Stern-Gerlach apparatus which first splits the particle’s tra-
jectory into upward and downward branches that are correlated with the spin component of 
the particle and next recombines the branches before the particle leaves the experiment. A 
macroscopic detector is located near the upward branch and acts as a measurement device. 
Let us find what observers would perceive measuring the particle’s spin after the particle has 
left the experiment. 
To provide the description of the particle flying from the apparatus after having inter-
acted briefly with the detector M and hence the entire macroscopic environment ENV, a solu-
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tion | ( )〉 to the Schrödinger equation for this particle might only be inexact (lest the exact 
solution involving the entangled states | ( )( )⟩
     
 and | ( )( )⟩
     
, 
| ( )〉  
 
√ 
(| ⟩ | ( )( )⟩
     
 | ⟩ | ( )( )⟩
     
)          (2) 
should be infeasible as possessing a great number of degrees of freedom). With that purpose, 
we accept two-sided random errors    and    in the definite energies   and   of the interac-
tion between the particle and the detector associated with the upward and downward branch-
es of the trajectory that the particle can take. If the resultant loss of information about the in-
teraction energies   and   would be maximal (that is, if the absolute values of the errors    
and    would be of the order of the interaction energies   and  ), then the interaction Hamil-
tonian     (diagonal in the position-spin-space basis as the interaction is due to the Coulomb 
force) would take the stochastic form containing only the degrees of freedom of the test-
particlee:     ( ̅    )| ⟩〈 |  ( ̅    )| ⟩〈 |; and so the state vector of the particle exiting 
                                                             
e The exact interaction Hamiltonian int would enclose operators    and   acting on the Hilbert space 
of the quantum states of the detector and the environment  int  | ⟩⟨ |    | ⟩⟨ |   . For simplici-
ty, if one treats the particle and the detector as a closed system, the  int  would take the form 
 int  (| ⟩⟨ |) (∑  |  ⟩〈  |
 
)  (| ⟩⟨ |) (∑  |  ⟩〈  |
 
)      
where |  ⟩ represent the detector’s orthonormal quantum states. The given form of the  int  indicates 
that each configuration of the detector’s microscopic constituent particles (like their positions) is char-
acterized by the certain energy of the interaction –    or    – for each path that the test-particle can 
take. However, because of too numerous microscopic degrees of freedom of the detector, the exact so-
lutions |  ⟩ to the detector’s Schrödinger equation are infeasible to compute. Therefore, for the test-
particle having interacted with the detector and then flying away we must be content with an approxi-
mate (coarse-grained) description that ignores the detector’s microscopic degrees of freedom. To ob-
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from the apparatus | ( )〉 would be given by the effect  ( )|   ⟩  | ( )〉 of the stochastic 
unitary time-evolution operator ( )     (     ⁄ ), where      : 
| ( )〉   {|  |   ̅ |  |   ̅     
 
√ 
(| ⟩    ̅  ⁄        ⁄  | ⟩    ̅  ⁄        ⁄ ) }      (3) 
To aggregate these non-deterministic solutions (3) we estimate the expected value of 
the probabilityf  (|   ⟩  | ( )〉)  |⟨   | ( )⟩|
  of the transition from the initially pre-
pared state |   ⟩ to the possible final state | ( )〉: 
|⟨   | ( )⟩| ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
 
 
 
 
   (
 ̅   ̅
 
 )    (
     
 
 )
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
       (4) 
Denoting the random value (     )  ⁄  by   and substituting 
           ( ̅   ̅)  ⁄ , we get the expression 
   ( )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
 ( ̅   ̅) 
∫    ( )  
   ( ̅  ̅) 
    ( ̅  ̅) 
 
 ̅  ̅   
        (5) 
which is about zero as the estimated interaction energies  ̅ and  ̅ (approximately proportional 
to the number of electrons in the detector) tend toward high values in the macroscopic limit. 
This yields the aggregate result (      ⁄ )    ⁄ , meaning that after the detector “ob-
serves” the particle, the subsequent measurement of the particle’s spin along the  -axis would 
find the eigenvalue   ⁄  almost half the time. In contrast, in the case of no interaction (i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
tain such a description we should consent to the maximum uncertainty about the interaction energies 
   and    such that    {|  |   ̅     ̅  |  |},    {|  |   ̅     ̅  |  |}: This would make the specif-
ics about the individual configurations of the detector’s microscopic particles immaterial to the inexact 
solutions | ( )〉, that is int  | ⟩⟨ |(  ̅  |  |) ̂  | ⟩⟨ |( ̅  |  |) ̂ (where  ̂ denotes the identity op-
erator). 
f It should be noted that we could not directly aggregate the solutions (3) because – as it has shown in 
the paper by Sexton and Jones22 – the arithmetic mean cannot be extended to complex numbers. 
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zero interaction time   or zero interaction energy), we would get  (      ⁄ )   , which 
means that the particle is not affected and therefore retains its spin. The analogous aggregate 
result  (      ⁄ )    would be ascertained if we let the particle in the eigenstate | ⟩ pass 
through the apparatus: The state | ( )〉 of this particle defined by the propagator ( )| ⟩ is an 
element of the following set 
| ( )〉   {|  |   ̅    | ⟩    ̅  ⁄        ⁄  }      (6) 
subsequently the set of the transition probabilities  (| ⟩  | ( )〉)  |⟨ | ( )⟩|  would be 
|⟨ | ( )⟩|   {|  |   ̅     |    ̅  ⁄        ⁄ |
 
   }      (7) 
Thus, allowing only feasibly computable (and therefore testable) solutions to the 
Schrödinger equation might reproduce approximately classical (i.e., probabilistically additive) 
results of the measurement and preclude details of the measuring device from appearing in 
the description of the measured system.g 
 
5. Measurement problem and P versus NP problem 
 
Intuitively it is clear that once the solution (               ) to the Schrödinger 
equation for a system of N interacting microscopic particles (each with spin) is known, to veri-
fy it would require a number of steps (i.e., observations or experiments), in any case, not 
greater than a polynomial of N. 
                                                             
g This would correspond to Streater’s remarks23: “The idea that the full details of the observer should 
be included in the Hilbert space is in violation of the scientific ethos... The theory needs a cut, between 
the observer and the system, and the details of the apparatus should not appear in the theory of the 
system”. 
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This entails that finding the function  that solves the Schrödinger equation is the 
mathematical problem in FNP complexity class (which is the function-problem extension of 
the decision-problem class NP). Roughly speaking, FNP is the class of functions that can be 
verified efficiently (i.e., quickly – in a polynomial number of steps), whereas FP is comprised of 
the class of functions that can be computed efficiently on a classical computer without ran-
domization24. As the assumption of limited computational power states, the wave function  is 
outside of the FP class. 
It is also intuitively clear that if the solution for a particular natural-world problem in 
any of the special sciences – chemistry, biology, neuroscience or others – can be expressed in 
the form of a function of the problem’s inputs       (i.e., input or independent variables), 
then the given solution (       ) would be easy to verify (i.e., it can be verified in a num-
ber of steps polynomial of M). Accordingly, this particular problem would be in the FNP com-
plexity class. 
Because of the Schrödinger equation’s fundamentality (this equation is supposed to 
govern all natural processes), each natural-world problem in the FNP class can be reducible to 
the problem of solving the Schrödinger equation for the corresponding underlying quantum 
model by replacing the natural-world problem’s inputs       with the model’s inputs 
             . If the solution (               ) to the Schrödinger equation for the 
underlying quantum counterpart is available, it can produce the solution (       ) to the 
given natural-world problem. Evidently, the reduction from finding  to computing  (the 
quantization procedure) is easy given that it would require a polynomial number of steps 
(such as quantization of the problem’s inputs       and observations of the initial values of 
the quantum model’s inputs              ). Consequently, we can say that solving the 
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Schrödinger equation is the FNP-complete problem, or, more precisely, it is the problem com-
plete for the class of natural-world problems that is a subset of the FNP class. 
In this sense, the many-body Schrödinger equation represents the class of natural-
world FNP problems, since any solution to it can – in combination with the reductions – be 
used to solve every problem in the class. So, if a fast algorithm could be ever invented for solv-
ing the many-body Schrödinger equation in its most general form, then it would have been es-
tablished that every natural-world problem in FNP has a fast algorithm, and, thus, that 
FP=FNP. 
Therefore, insisting on unrestricted, limitless reductionism (i.e., claiming that every 
system is basically quantum mechanical) implies the equivalence of the classes P=NP (as 
FP=FNP iff P=NP25), while accepting the limitation of reductionism (in the form of the as-
sumption of limited computational power) would imply the opposite assertion PNP. 
In particular, affirming that classical mechanics is simply a quantum mechanics of large 
systems infers that for each large system the Schrödinger equation has a fast deterministic so-
lution that can be easily transformed in one of classical mechanics. However, this can occur 
only if the mathematical classes P and NP-complete are equal. Differently, stating that classical 
physics does not emerge from quantum physics infers that the Schrödinger equation cannot be 
efficiently solvable in deterministic terms for every large system describable by classical phys-
ics. This necessarily leads to the conclusion that PNP. 
As follows, two unresolved problems – the measurement problem in quantum mechan-
ics (that asks whether the quantum description of macroscopic objects can be valid) and the P 
versus NP problem in computer science (that asks whether NP-complete problems can be 
solved in polynomial time by a deterministic algorithm) – may possibly be connected. Answer-
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ing in the negative or the positive to the former might one-to-one determine the answer of 
“no” or “yes” to the latter, and vice versa. 
This means we can phrase the mathematical question of P versus NP in terms of the 
quantum measurement problem. And if we accept the physical process criterion for mathe-
matical truth26, saying that “we should expect a mathematical question to have a definite an-
swer, if and only if we can phrase the question in terms of a physical process we can imagine”, 
this may suggest that the P versus NP question does have a definite answer.h 
 
6. Discussion 
 
The assumption of limited computational power is built around the thesis of feasibility 
of theory, which maintains that in order to be valid a scientific theory is required to be at least 
feasible. Applying this thesis to the quantum formalism entails that the quantum-mechanical 
description of a system cannot be valid unless it is based on the feasibly computable solutions 
to the Schrödinger equation for the system. 
Though this thesis seems plain and natural, it is open to as a minimum a few objections. 
1. The first and possibly the most obvious objection (and yet the most strenuous one) 
would be that whether a theory is valid or not has nothing to do with the ease of computation. 
That is, the entire approach undertaken in this paper rests on a basic confusion between the 
validity of a theory and the practical problem of calculating solutions to its equation of motion. 
Before replying to this objection, let us first clarify how the validity of theory is tested. 
Probably, the most apparent answer would be this: A theory is valid if it can make predictions 
that can be tested and when tested are found to be true. 
                                                             
h In other words, this may suggest that the assertion P=NP is falsifiable. 
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The validity of quantum theory for a given physical system rests on the validity of the 
Schrödinger's equation, which provides a way to calculate all the possible solutions (the wave-
functions) of the system and how they dynamically change in time. This may be express as fol-
lows: The quantum description of a system is valid if one can calculate the solutions to the 
Schrödinger's equation for the given system that can be tested and when tested are found to 
be true. So, the practical feasibility of calculating the solutions to the Schrödinger's equation is 
the first and foremost component in the validity of the quantum theory for this system since if 
the solutions are not feasible, they cannot be testable either. 
On the other hand, the theoretical framework of quantum mechanics never calls into 
question the chances that the Schrödinger's equation has of being solvable for a particular sys-
tem. This seems to originate in the presupposition that the exact solutions to the Schrödinger 
equation can always be efficiently calculable (i.e., feasible) for any given N‐body system. How-
ever, this might not be true. 
Indeed, if the mathematical classes P and NP-complete were not equal then solving the 
Schrödinger equation would be an intractable problem: The equation would be solvable but 
any exact algorithmic solution to it would run in exponential time (or slower) in the worst 
case. This means that in the case of a macroscopic system there would not be any real hope of 
deciding whether this equation is true or false of real experience. Hence, the deterministic 
quantum-mechanical description of the macroscopic system could not be testable and thus 
valid. 
2. When applying the feasibility thesis to the classical formalism, would it entail that 
the classical-mechanical description of the N‐body problem of Newtonian gravitation could 
not be valid too? 
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Actually, solving the Newton N‐body problem is computationally easy, because it mere-
ly involves integrating the 6N ordinary differential equations defining the particle motions in 
Newtonian gravity. This numerical integration is reachable in the number of calculations not 
greater than  . Accordingly, one may conclude that the classical-mechanical description of 
the system of N celestial objects interacting with each other gravitationally can be valid be-
cause it is based on the feasibly computable and so testable solutions to the Newton’s equation 
of motion for the system. 
In contrast, solving the quantum N‐body problem is computationally hard, because in 
such a system direct (or indirect) interactions between constituent microscopic particles lead 
to quantum entanglement. As a result, the Schrödinger equation for this system involves a 
function holding a large amount of information and is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to 
solve in a reasonable amount of time. For example, a system of only 100 spin-  ⁄  particles re-
quires        complex numbers to merely describe a general spin state. Consequently, a 
proof of PNP would guarantee that the quantum N‐body problem would be generally intrac-
table and so the deterministic quantum-mechanical description of a truly macroscopic object 
(consisting of a large number N of interacting constituent microscopic particles) could not be 
valid. 
3. One need not have solved the Schrödinger equation to show that superpositions of 
different macroscopic configurations of macro-objects cannot be avoided within a strict quan-
tum mechanical scheme. Therefore, the claim presented in the paper that the difficulty of ob-
taining a solution to the Schrödinger equation for macro-objects could resolve the measure-
ment problem is unsustainable. 
Presumably this objection results from the following logic: Since at the microscopic 
level the Schrödinger equation has the testable property of linearity (that has been experimen-
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tally verified extensively through the observation of interference effects, for instance) and 
since during transition from the microscopic level to the macroscopic one the form of this 
equation is in no way changed, then its property of linearity cannot have changed either. 
However, such an assumption ignores the inherent computational hardness of the 
Schrödinger equation. If NP-complete problems had no deterministic polynomial-time solu-
tions (i.e., PNP), then at the macroscopic level the Schrödinger equation – even though its 
form would not be changed – would become unsolvable in deterministic terms for all practical 
purposes. This means that exact macroscopic solutions to the Schrödinger equation as well as 
their linear combinations would not be feasible and thus testable. 
4. The difficulty of obtaining a solution to the Schrödinger equation depends on the 
choice of basis, in which the wave function is expressed (in the paper the choice is positions 
and spin). But by choosing a different basis, i.e., applying a unitary transformation, the equa-
tion might become much simpler. (This corresponds to the transition from the Schrödinger to 
the Heisenberg representation.) It is not clear how the dependence of computational difficulty 
on representation would bear on the claim about the validity of the theory, as implied by the 
feasibility thesis, assuming that the validity of a theory is independent of its representation. 
It is true that by certain manipulations, such as coordinate transformations, the choice 
of a different basis, or a basis change with the respect to time-dependency (e.g., the transition 
from the Schrödinger picture to the Heisenberg one), it is possible to make the N-body Schrö-
dinger equation easier to handle (or even to solve it) in some special cases and for some lim-
ited N. 
The trouble is, however, that even though such manipulations that bring down the N-
body Schrödinger equation has been rightly guessed in some cases, no particular rule is fol-
lowed how to have the same lucky guess in all other cases. Since this rule is unknown, to 
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search through possible manipulations one has to incline to the use of brute-force methods, 
which get infeasible very quickly as N grows. This is why the N-body Schrödinger equation is 
computationally difficult, and this difficultness (FNP-complete) is independent from the par-
ticular representation or basis. 
5. How would the computational difficulty depend on the interaction between the par-
ticles? If, for example, the solution to the Schrödinger equation becomes intractable regardless 
of the interaction term, i.e., even if there is no interaction, then quantum theory would seem to 
break down in the macroscopic limit regardless of whether a measurement is being made. 
That would not be a solution of the measurement problem per se. 
Perhaps, the most important question in the measurement problem is how to describe 
the interaction between the microscopic quantum object and the (macroscopic) measuring 
apparatus. Specifically, should the measuring apparatus be described as a quantum system 
and hence all the measuring process as an interaction between two quantum systems? 
The answer to this question (and consequently the resolution of the measurement 
problem) depends on the answer to the P versus NP question. 
If, for instance, PNP, it entails that the measuring apparatus is infeasible to describe 
by exact solutions to the apparatus’s Schrödinger equation. Consequently, if the microscopic 
quantum object (initially isolated and described by the feasibly computable deterministic solu-
tions to the micro-object’s Schrödinger equation) were brought into interaction with the 
measuring apparatus, then after the measurement interaction the only solutions to the Schrö-
dinger equation for the micro-object feasible to compute would be probabilistic solutions. 
On the other hand, if P=NP, it results in that the quantum formalism should be taken to 
apply to all physical systems, including the measuring apparatus. In that case, if such an appa-
ratus describable by feasibly computable exact solutions to the apparatus’s Schrödinger equa-
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tion interacted with the microscopic quantum object, the final state of these two quantum sys-
tems (the micro-object + the apparatus) could be a superposition. 
6. The claim that solutions of the many-body Schrödinger equation are in general un-
feasible, i.e., not reachable in polynomial time, is only an assumption of the paper, but would 
need substantiation. 
Though in the paper the FNP-completeness of the general deterministic solution to the 
many-body Schrödinger equation is presented as rather a theoretical conclusion drawn from 
abstract reasoning, it can be easily substantiated by the known facts about the computational 
hardness of this equation in many particular cases. 
For example, the efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) general solution of the Schrödinger 
equation for a system with large number of strongly interacting fermions would imply the full 
and generic solution of the numerical sign problem – the well-known NP-hard problem27 – in 
polynomial time. 
Furthermore, to provide a deterministic quantum-mechanical description of a truly 
macroscopic object would involve a precise determination of its molecular binding energy, 
which in turn would require the efficient solution to the so-called N-representability problem. 
However, as it has been shown recently28, both fermionic and bosonic versions of this problem 
are QMA-hard (referring to quantum Merlin-Arthur problems, which are considered difficult 
even for quantum computers). 
7. Carroll29 raises this objection: “No one denies that in practice we can never describe 
human beings as collections of electrons, protons, and neutrons obeying the Schrödinger equa-
tion. But many of us think that this is clearly an issue of practice vs. principle; the ability of our 
finite minds to collect the relevant data and solve the relevant equations should not be taken 
as evidence that the universe is not fully capable of doing so.” 
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According to the survey20, none of the models of computation – known or potential one 
– that are based on physical processes can solve NP-complete problems in polynomial time. 
So, the computational hardness of the Schrödinger equation looks more like the naturally im-
posed limit to reductionism than our own inability as human beings to solve difficult prob-
lems. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In nearly all of the papers on the foundations of quantum mechanics, when discussing 
the measurement problem and its possible solutions, the authors never doubt ability of the 
Schrödinger equation to be exactly solved for every physical entity (regardless of spatial size, 
physical property, and the like), including “all environmental particles within the causal hori-
zon for the apparatus”30, “observers with their perceptive and cognitive apparatuses”11, and 
even the entire universe. Such a belief in limitless reductionism, i.e., in the across the board 
efficient solvability of the Schrödinger equation, is exactly what makes possible for one to de-
clare a truly macroscopic object to be a quantum one (for the further use in the theory) and 
thus to allow the occurrence of superpositions of macroscopically different states of the mac-
ro-object.  
Apparently, the reasoning behind this belief is the following: It does not matter that at 
this point in time the equation of motion of a theory is much too complicated to be exactly sol-
uble for a given system because even if the required solution cannot be ultimately expressed 
as a closed-form or analytic expression, a sufficiently powerful numerical method will always 
be able to compute it with an arbitrary precision and in reasonable time. 
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Seeing that this line of reasoning works well in the case of the equation of motion of 
classical or relativistic mechanics, one might expect that the same argument would also be jus-
tifiable in the case of the Schrödinger equation. 
However, as the recent developments in the computational complexity theory imply, 
this is an unlikely hypothesis. Since the standard complexity theorists’ opinion is that there are 
no deterministic polynomial-time solutions to NP-hard problems (though proving this seems 
as one of the deepest problems in all of mathematics), the many-body Schrödinger equation is 
an intractable problem, for which there are not any exact generic polynomial-time solutions. 
This may suggest a likely resolution to the measurement, or macro-objectification, 
problem: The purely quantum description is not applicable to a truly macroscopic object be-
cause the Schrödinger equation for this object is unsolvable except in terms of probability for 
all practical purposes. 
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